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Reconstructing the Constitutional Theory of
Mount Laurel II
John M. Payne*
The Mount Laurel II opinion, under the heading “Constitutional
Basis,” contains the following quite remarkable passage:
It would be useful to remind ourselves that the [Mount Laurel]
doctrine does not arise from some theoretical analysis of our
Constitution, but rather from underlying concepts of
fundamental fairness in the exercise of governmental power.
The basis for the constitutional obligation is simple: the State
controls the use of land, all of the land. In exercising that
control it cannot favor rich over poor. It cannot legislatively set
aside dilapidated housing in urban ghettos for the poor and
decent housing elsewhere for everyone else. The government
that controls this land represents everyone. While the State
may not have the ability to eliminate poverty, it cannot use that
condition as the basis for imposing further disadvantages. And
the same applies to the municipality, to which this control over
land has been constitutionally delegated.
The clarity of the constitutional obligation is seen most simply
by imagining what this state could be like were this claim
never to be recognized and enforced: poor people forever
zoned out of substantial areas of the state, not because housing
could not be built for them but because they are not wanted;
poor people forced to live in urban slums forever not because
suburbia, developing rural areas, fully developed residential
sections, seashore resorts, and other attractive locations could
not accommodate them, but simply because they are not
wanted. It is a vision not only at variance with the requirement
* Professor of Law, Rutgers Law School-Newark. During the long gestation period of
the background research from which this essay is drawn, Steve W. Vaccaro, Lori Downey, and
Kevin L. Esposito provided creative and invaluable research assistance.
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that the zoning power be used for the general welfare but with
all concepts of fundamental fairness and decency that underpin
many constitutional obligations.1
I have long puzzled over this passage with a mixture of awe and
frustration. On the one hand, it lays down, with admirable clarity, the
moral justification for the aggressive set of remedies that Mount
Laurel II adopts, specifically the remedy of inclusionary zoning. It
does so, moreover, with an eloquence not usually encountered in
judicial writing. On the other hand, however, the eloquence obscures
as much as it illuminates. Most notably it obscures the question of
why affirmative action on the part of governments is constitutionally
required to address the housing needs of poor people, and how it is
that a court, which normally reviews rather than instigates public
policy actions, gets to take the lead. This obscurity suggests a missing
link and invites a critical question: how close does Mount Laurel II
come to declaring a constitutional right to shelter under the New
Jersey Constitution?
Sitting at the intersection of land use policy and the law of state
and local government, it seemed appropriate to undertake some
musings on this large question as my offering to Professor Daniel
Mandelker, whose long career of scholarship and advocacy has
centered on these areas with thoroughness, insight and spirit.
I. DECONSTRUCTING THE CONSTITUTIONAL BASIS OF MOUNT 
LAUREL II
Let us first work through the passage set out above with a bit more
care to catalogue the points that it makes and the questions that it
raises. At the outset Chief Justice Wilentz, the author of Mount
Laurel II, rejects a “theoretical” rationale, looking instead to
“underlying concepts of fundamental fairness in the exercise of
governmental power.” This puts the court squarely in the territory of
substantive due process and immediately sounds alarm bells of
judicial process; how can the justices escape the charge that they are
1. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 456 A.2d 390,
415 (N. S. 1983) [Mount Laurel II].
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implementing their own personal values rather than enforcing a legal
(theoretical?) text? Are they Lochnerizing? An answer of sorts
follows immediately, in the famous passage noting that “the State
controls the use of land, all of the land.” But this cryptic phrase is
hardly self explanatory, as we shall see, and it is followed by
normative statements about the need for “decent housing” for
“everyone,” suggesting an equal protection rationale as well.
Returning to a more traditional mode, the Court acknowledges that
“the State may not have the ability to eliminate poverty,” (note the
tentativeness of the “may not” phrase, however), and it continues
cautiously, implying that a government’s obligation is merely to
refrain from making poverty worse by “imposing further
disadvantages.” The paragraph concludes with a clear statement that
the constitutional obligation applies to the state itself, not just to local
governments that exercise delegated state power.
The second paragraph sketches a dismal “what if” scenario worthy
of Charles Dickens’ Ghost of Christmas Future, a picture of what
would ensue if the “constitutional obligation” behind the Mount
Laurel doctrine were “never to be recognized and enforced,”
implicitly asserting an affirmative governmental obligation to create a
society where there is decent housing for all. The paragraph ends
with a reiteration of “fundamental fairness and decency” as
limitations on the general welfare power, limitations that “underpin
many constitutional obligations.” This perhaps extends the
affirmative action principle of Mount Laurel II out beyond shelter
needs and towards a general governmental obligation to sustain what
Professor Frank Michelman memorably called “minimum welfare.”2
II. BACKGROUND: GETTING TO MOUNT LAUREL II
The Mount Laurel doctrine was first stated by the New Jersey
Supreme Court in a prior case, also involving Mount Laurel
Township, that declared exclusionary zoning unconstitutional.3 While
2. Frank I. Michelman, Forward: On Protecting the Poor Through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 83 HARV. L. REV. 7 (1969).
3. Southern Burlington County NAACP v. Township of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 713
(1975) [Mount Laurel I].
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the specific holding of Mount Laurel I was a radical break with the
traditional judicial approach to land use issues, Justice Hall’s opinion
was deeply rooted in the soil of ancient state constitutional doctrine.
Rejecting sub silentio the lower court’s reliance on federal equal
protection cases,4 he instead looked to the basis on which any
sovereign governmental action must be justified-the police power-
and found Mount Laurel Township’s exclusionary ordinances
wanting.
Justice Hall’s syllogism was straightforward: the police power is
the power of the state to act for the general welfare of the people of
the state; the police power may be delegated to local governments,
but only if municipalities also stay within the general welfare
requirement; a land use ordinance that serves the parochial welfare of
a single community to the detriment of the general welfare is
therefore unconstitutional as beyond the power of government. The
court’s thinking was, as Justice Hall himself put it in the opinion,
“advanced” in the way it applied the general welfare concept to
regional, as opposed to local, interests5 and in its refusal to give local
governments the deference they had traditionally enjoyed in
determining what constitutes “the general welfare.” But there was
nothing at all remarkable about the court’s concern that local
governments, as delegates of the state sovereign, must act within the
limits of sovereign power as those limits had passed down from king
and parliament through the common law to our own state
constitutions.
In the period between Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II, it was
thought that the remedy for an exclusionary ordinance was to excise,
either voluntarily or under court order, the exclusionary features that
did not meet the “general welfare” criterion, such as large lot zoning
and multi-family prohibitions, requirements that drove up the cost of
housing without solving any legitimate health or safety concern. The
implicit premise was that less restrictive ordinances, permitting less
expensive, more affordable housing, would be a proper exercise of
the municipality’s delegated police power and would serve “the
general welfare.” Because so few cases came to judgment between
4. Id. at 725.
5. Id. at 726.
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1975 and 1983, all of this remained mostly speculation. However, in
the only Supreme Court opinion to deal with remedies after Mount
Laurel I and before Mount Laurel II, the Court said that more
aggressive judicial remedies would be warranted only in rare and
unusual circumstances, and for a secondary constitutional purpose.6
Finally in 1983 and in the face of massive resistance to the Mount
Laurel doctrine, judicial stasis, and meager results, the New Jersey
Supreme Court in Mount Laurel II faced the inevitable. It
acknowledged that the remedies issues had to be dealt with, and it
dealt with them comprehensively. Mount Laurel II purported to leave
the doctrinal foundation of Mount Laurel I untouched,7 but by 1983
the Justices knew that the essentially passive remedies contemplated
by Justice Hall a decade earlier could not produce very much hous-
ing.8 The economic boom of the 1980s was in full swing, and the
private housing market was in the grip of rapidly escalating prices
driven by an excess of demand over supply. Private developers could
sell almost anything that they could build, and more permissive
ordinances would simply have resulted in expensive houses at higher
(and more profitable) densities, rather than inexpensive houses and
apartments at small profits for poorer people. Nor, by 1983, would
more permissive ordinances open the door to “social housing”-low
cost units subsidized by public agencies or non-profit corporations-
because by then the Reagan administration had taken the federal
government out of the housing business and state subsidy programs
were tiny in comparison to the need.
Faced with these certainties, the Mount Laurel II court took the
obvious, but very large, next step by holding that if “fair share”
housing goals could not otherwise be met, inclusionary zoning
ordinances must be adopted.9 Since the Justices surely knew that
6. See Oakwood at Madison, Inc. v. Township of Madison, 371 A.2d 1192, 1227 (1977).
The court mandated “inclusionary zoning,” on one site, as a “reward” to the developer-plaintiff
who owned the site for having brought the litigation that policed the municipality’s
unconstitutionally exclusionary conduct. This became known as the “builder’s remedy.”
Oakwood does not suggest that inclusionary zoning should be the norm. see infra note 9.
7. Mount Laurel II, 336 A.2d at 415.
8. See Martha Lamar et al; Mount Laurel at Work: Affordable Housing in New Jersey,
1983-1988, 41 RUTGERS L. REV. 1197, 1210 (1989) (seventy-five percent of all new housing
built under Mount Laurel II was in inclusionary form).
9. Inclusionary zoning is an ordinance technique linking high-density residential zoning
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passive remedies would not produce much affordable housing, Mount
Laurel II essentially mandates affirmative regulatory action by local
governments to correct a market failure in producing such housing.
This history is threaded through Chief Justice Wilentz’s
“constitutional basis” passage. The “passive virtues” of Mount Laurel
I, to use a famous legal process phrase,10 are present in the court’s
admonition that due process and the general welfare do not permit
legislation to make things worse for poor people, even if poverty
cannot be cured by the state. The inclusionary remedies of Mount
Laurel II respond to the affirmative principle of “fundamental
fairness and decency” with which the passage ends. The tension,
however, between the two approaches is left unresolved. In pointing
this out, I do not mean to imply criticism of the direction that Mount
Laurel II took. I recognize fully the value of bringing affirmative
remedies such as inclusionary zoning into the mix. If the goal was to
ameliorate poverty by increasing the supply of “affordable” housing,
Mount Laurel II has “worked,” as studies have shown.11 Moreover,
for reasons that should become clear shortly, I concede that it was
impossible for the court to lay out the actual underpinnings of its
decision in 1983. The opinion itself was already pushing the envelope
of public acceptance. But lacking a fully-articulated rationale, I fear
that the Mount Laurel doctrine has not accomplished as much as it
might have accomplished. I also fear that what has in fact been
to a requirement that a percentage of the resulting units (twenty percent is the Mount Laurel
norm) be offered for sale or rent at prices affordable to low and moderate income households.
See generally, ALAN MALLACH, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND
PRACTICES, (1984). To avoid constitutional takings problems, inclusionary zoning is usually
presented as an alternative to much lower density zoning on the same site, so that whatever loss
results from selling the “affordable” units can be said to be recouped by the additional profits
derived from the extra market rate units permitted by the higher density. As Mount Laurel II
makes clear, however, where a Mount Laurel obligation cannot otherwise be met, it is not
sufficient for the ordinance to give the developer a choice between a traditional low density
market development and a higher density inclusionary one. 456 A.2d at 446 (“[a] device that
municipalities must use”) (emphasis added). This underscores the extent to which the Court’s
remedial concern in Mount Laurel II shifts from passive (the municipality’s ordinances should
“get out of the way” and let society do its work) to active (solving the problem itself). Id.
10. Alexander Bickel, Forward: The Passive Virtues, 75 HARV. L. REV. 40 (1961).
11. Lamar, supra note 8; see also John M. Payne, Norman Williams, Exclusionary
Zoning, and the Mount Laurel Doctrine: Making the Theory Fit the Facts, 20 VT. L. REV. 665,
667-73 (1996).
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accomplished cannot lay the groundwork for a process that is self-
sustaining over time.
A. The Rationale Rejected
As we begin sorting out the constitutional basis of Mount Laurel
II, it is useful to clarify first a rationale that the Court, by its silence
on the subject, emphatically rejects. One could argue that the shift to
an active affordable housing remedy was necessary to compensate for
the years of exclusionary zoning that occurred before, and after,
Mount Laurel I in 1975, and that the Court was applying, consciously
or otherwise, the theory of affirmative remedies developed by the
United States Supreme Court to implement Brown v. Board of
Education.12 Brown began, as did the Mount Laurel doctrine, with the
passive remedy of invalidation. However, when it became clear that
the eradication of de jure segregation could not by itself eradicate the
effects of segregation, the Court eventually embraced, with a
surprising degree of vigor, a set of affirmative race-conscious
remedies. These remedies included “forced busing” and the Court
was quick to emphasize that it could not have been ordered absent a
prior finding of a constitutional violation.13 Affirmative, integrative
measures were justified as an equitable remedy for past
unconstitutional conduct. Recent decisions permitting southern
school districts to operate de facto segregated schools without busing
and other affirmative measures, once the stigma of the prior de jure
segregation has been eliminated, reinforce the conclusion that federal
law requires desegregation, not integration.14
Like Brown, Mount Laurel I clearly opts for the cautious, passive
remedy of ordinance invalidation,15 and by using parallel reasoning,
the Mount Laurel II court could have shifted to the affirmative
remedy of inclusionary zoning because, but only because, the passive
12. 347 U.S. 483 (1954); See Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1
(1971); Green v. County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
13. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1, 26 (1971).
14. See Board of Educ. v. Dowell, 498 U.S. 237 (1991).
15. The Court’s approach is reinforced by Justice Pashman’s vigorous (and prescient)
concurring opinion, in which he argues for affirmative remedies not unlike those adopted eight
years later in Mount Laurel II.
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remedy of dismantling exclusionary zoning was insufficient to
eradicate the prior constitutional violation. Inclusionary zoning would
not have had an independent constitutional value, but only value as a
means to “cure” past exclusion by providing some of the housing that
would otherwise have been built had the towns not been
exclusionary. By failing to draw the obvious comparison, the Mount
Laurel II court invites the conclusion that inclusionary zoning is not a
remedy for unconstitutional exclusionary zoning, but instead is a
remedy for a new theory of constitutional violation that the court
declines to articulate.
Chief Justice Wilentz asserts emphatically that the nature of the
constitutional obligation has not changed,16 but the remainder of his
opinion belies that bland assertion. Most tellingly, the Mount Laurel
II opinion is explicit in holding that every one of the state’s 567
municipalities has a constitutional fair share obligation, whether or
not it had actively pursued exclusionary policies in the past.17
Compliance with the constitution does not turn on either good faith or
bad faith, but on an objective measure of how likely it is that the
needed housing will in fact be built.18
In hindsight it is somewhat surprising that the Court did not use
the Brown analogy, which certainly would have lent additional
legitimacy to its explanation of why municipalities had to undergo
the wrenching process of court-ordered rezoning. The court could
still have required the calculation of “fair share” numbers, and could
have treated municipalities that didn’t accommodate those numbers
as presumptively exclusionary, and in this way the remediation
theory would have permitted widespread application of an
inclusionary requirement. Moreover, the plain fact was that most
suburban communities were exclusionary, fair share numbers or not,
16. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 415.
17. Mount Laurel II, supra note 1, 92 N.J. at 214, 456 A.2d at 418.
18. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 419. The Court permits evidence of past
exclusionary practices as an alternate way of proving the constitutional violation, but does not
require it. In practice, once the methodology of a post-Mount Laurel II fair share formula was
worked out, it was so easy to prove the number and the fact that it wasn’t being met that
defendant municipalities almost invariable conceded the violation and concentrated on
disputing the form of remedy. See AMG Realty Co. v. Township of Warren, 504 A.2d 692
(L.Div. 1984).
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and it would have taken some of the pressure off the Court had it
been able to excuse from compliance those few communities that had
actually sought to create balanced housing patterns.
On the other hand, the remedial model is not without problems of
its own and the Court, never addressing the matter directly,
nonetheless seems to have been aware of the risks. As opposed to the
“realistic opportunity” standard that the court actually adopted, an
emphasis on remediation might be seen as less flexible and hence less
deferential to other legitimate local needs or concerns. The overriding
objective would have been to undo the past, with correspondingly
less room to incorporate the broader ecological and planning
considerations on which the Court placed so much emphasis in
Mount Laurel II. Since “undoing the past” is an inherently
speculative process19 an emphasis on “remedial inclusion,” with no
obvious end-point in sight, might have exacerbated the problem of
judicial policy-making rather than minimized it. In addition,
remediation bespeaks “punishment.” Experience in other aspects of
civil rights litigation suggests that public agencies will often fight
hardest to avoid being branded a moral wrongdoer, thus offsetting the
moral advantage that the remedial model has in the eyes of outsiders.
Ironically, the Court may have achieved the worst of both worlds.
By eschewing the remedial model, it lost whatever increment of
moral appeal there was to outsiders who might have been persuaded
that wrongdoing must be undone. At the same time, by embracing
inclusionary zoning for builders who successfully sued (the widely-
reviled “builder’s remedy”), it introduced a large measure of site-
specific inflexibility that proved to be a lightening rod for opposition
to the Mount Laurel doctrine. The court’s attempts to condition the
builder’s remedy on compliance with environmental and other sound
planning considerations was simply drowned out in the ensuing
controversy.
A long-running case that straddles the regimes of Mount Laurel I
and Mount Laurel II illustrates the pros and cons of “realistic
opportunity” versus “remediation.” Madison Township (later
renamed Old Bridge) “was the only township in central New Jersey
19. It cannot be known what actually would have been built, and for whom, especially in
an economy that gravitates towards higher-income needs.
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that had permitted large numbers of multiple dwellings as of right . . .
[and the case involved] an ecologically sensitive site.”20 Thus, a case
against Madison Township solely to remedy past discrimination
would have been relatively weak, compared to the blatant and total
exclusion in Mount Laurel Township. Nonetheless, because it was
still in the path of growth (to use the formulation of Mount Laurel I)
and it had a large amount of developable land, Madison Township
was eventually found to have a general constitutional obligation
under the “realistic opportunity” standard of the Mount Laurel
doctrine. The decision, Oakwood at Madison v. Madison Township,21
became the vehicle for the court’s first tentative embrace of the
builder’s remedy doctrine,22 but it might never have happened under
the remedial model. This is not to say that Oakwood was wrongly
decided, only to say that the fact that the township lost underscores
the point that the remedial model was not what was driving the
Mount Laurel doctrine.
B. The “Welfare Rights” Model
Ultimately, I think, we are left with no choice but to conclude that
the actual “constitutional basis” of Mount Laurel II is that the New
Jersey Constitution embodies an implicit constitutional right to
shelter. If so, explaining Mount Laurel II becomes simple (although
hardly uncontroversial). Armed with such a right, Mount Laurel
plaintiffs would have a straightforward case to make, which in its
most dramatic form would be that the government must either
provide shelter directly to those needing it, or that it must insure that
other housing providers do so, at costs affordable to people of all
incomes. The affirmative nature of the judicially enforced obligation
would follow easily from the citizen’s (presumed) affirmative
constitutional entitlement to the commodity in question.
Of course, there is a certain awkwardness in the fact that the New
Jersey Supreme Court does not come out and say explicitly in Mount
20. Norman Williams, The Background and Significance of Mount Laurel II, 26 Wash. U.
J. URB & CONTEMP. L. 3, 7 n.14 (1984).
21. See supra note 6.
22. Id.
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Laurel II, and it has rather conspicuously avoided the opportunity to
utter the “rights” words in other related cases.23 Moreover, the Mount
Laurel cases require only a “realistic opportunity,” not a “realistic
house,” a standard that would seem to fall well short of what would
satisfy the constitution if there were indeed a full-blown right to
shelter. Nevertheless, the internal logic of the shift from the passive
remedies of Mount Laurel I to the active stance of Mount Laurel II is
powerful evidence that some kind of “rights” thinking was at work in
1983, whether the Court chooses to say so or not.
Moreover, a source for the Court’s putative rights thinking is
readily at hand. Like many state constitutions, New Jersey’s
guarantees individual rights in natural law terms.24 Article I,
Paragraph 1 (“Rights and Liberties”) confirms (but does not confer,
because the rights are, as the Constitution states, “natural and
unalienable”) rights and privileges that the people of New Jersey
possess as individuals, enforceable not only against public actors but
against each other as private citizens as well.25 Paragraph 1 is written
in broadly inclusive terms as a set of concrete examples of these
rights, rather than a definitive and exhaustive list.26 “Among” the
rights recognized are “those of enjoying and defending life and
liberty, of acquiring, possessing, and protecting property, and of
pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”27 In other contexts, the
New Jersey Supreme Court has not hesitated to find unenumerated
23. See infra notes 67-68 and accompanying text.
24. I confine myself in this analysis to New Jersey law and precedent because that is what
drives the Mount Laurel doctrine. Allowing for inevitable variations state to state, there is
nothing about New Jersey law (other than the singular Mount Laurel cases themselves) that
cannot be replicated to one degree or another in most other states. See State v. Schmid, 423
A.2d 615(1980).
25. State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 628 (1980). See also infra note 52.
26. See N.J. CONST Art I. § 21 (“This enumeration of rights and privileges shall not be
construed to impair or deny others retained by the people.”)
27. N.J. CONST, art. I § 1. This language has its origins in George Mason’s highly
influential 1775 Committee Draft of the Virginia Declaration of Rights. Franklin v. New Jersey
Dep’t of Human Services, 543 A.2d 56, 67 n.11 (App. Div. 1988) aff’d 543 A.2d 1 (1988). See
also THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON, 1725-1792. 289 (Robert A. Rutland ed, 1970). The same
or similar language can be found in many other state constitutions. See: ARK CONST. art. II, § 2;
CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 3; IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1; IOWA CONST. art.
I, § 1; KY. CONST. art. I, § 1; ME. CONST. art. I, § 1; MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. I [§ 2]; MONT.
CONST. art. II, § 3; NEV. CONST. art. I, § 1; N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. II; N.M. CONST. art. II, § 4;
N.D. CONST. art. I, § 1; OHIO CONST. art. I, § 1; PA. CONST. art. I, § 1. [emphasis added]
Washington University Open Scholarship
p555+Payne.doc 01/04/01
566 Festschrift [Vol. 3:555
rights within the scope of Article I, Paragraph 1, most notably by
reading in the right to equal protection of the laws and the right of
privacy.28 In this context the Chief Justice’s reminder that the
constitutional principle of fundamental fairness and decency
“underpin[s] many constitutional obligations”29 clearly points in the
direction I suggested earlier, towards a generalized social welfare
right.
Putting aside for the moment any questions about the generalized
right, it would seem almost beyond question that the right to shelter
fits within this framework. Shelter is a basic human need. Adequate
shelter, particularly in our harsh climate, is essential to the defense of
life itself. In order to obtain shelter, one must acquire property, at
least the bare possessory interest of physical occupation of a sheltered
space. Acquiring shelter is synonymous with the pursuit and
attainment of safety, to say nothing of happiness, liberty, and the
valuable use of property for self-advancement. The “right to shelter”
tracks precisely the language of Article I, Paragraph 1. In addition,
shelter can be understood as a necessary precondition to the
enjoyment of other constitutionally recognized and protected
liberties.30 Just as the poorly-educated child may be foreclosed from
effective enjoyment of the liberty of conscience, speech, and political
participation,31 so too any person who is so poorly fed, clothed, and
sheltered from the elements that the struggle to exist becomes the
sole focus of life, is going to find the enlightened guarantees of Art. I,
28. Levine v. Depart. of Institutions & Agencies, 418 A.2d 229, 241 (1980) (equal
protection); Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 933 (1982) (privacy; collecting cases).
29. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 415 (emphasis added).
30. See, e.g., Inez Smith Reid, Law, Politics, and the Homeless, 89 W. VA. L. REV. 115,
144 (1986) (arguing that homeless persons are deprived of a constitutionally protected right to
establish a home); Mark A. Godsey, Comment, Privacy and the Growing Plight of the
Homeless: Reconsidering the Values Underlying the Fourth Amendment, 53 OHIO STATE L.J.
869 (1992) (arguing that basing the constitutionally protected sphere of privacy on the
possession of property deprived homeless persons of privacy); Paul Ades, Comment, The
Unconstitutionality of “Antihomeless” Laws: Ordinances Prohibiting Sleeping in Outdoor
Public Areas as a Violation of the Right to Travel, 77 CAL. L. REV. 595 (1989) (arguing that
laws which proscribe sleeping in outdoor public areas violate the right of homeless persons to
travel).
31. This argument is most famously made in Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissenting
opinion in San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 112-13, (1973);
see also Abbott v. Burke, 575 A.2d 359, 397 (1990).
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Paragraph 1, mostly irrelevant.
Despite all of this, the court’s unwillingness to explicitly declare a
“right to shelter” is understandable. Given the legal process problems
that had already occurred in implementing the Mount Laurel doctrine
as it had been articulated up to that point, the justices undoubtedly
thought that enforcement of a broadly-stated constitutional right to
shelter (which I have deliberately put as broadly as possible in order
to underscore its open-endedness) would be well beyond the practical
capacity of the judicial system. Indeed, the logic of the underlying
moral claim is so strong that one has to think that it is only the
process problems that hold the court back, to avoid provoking a
profound confrontation with the executive and the legislature.
The linkage between the constitutional rights of the plaintiffs and
the limitations of judicial process seems to be on the Chief Justice’s
mind as well. The full title of this part of the opinion, which I earlier
rendered as “Constitutional Basis,” is actually “Constitutional Basis
for Mount Laurel and the Judicial Role.” [emphasis added] Towards
the end of the quoted section, he acknowledges the “social and
economic controversy” and the “political consequences” that the
Mount Laurel doctrine had spawned, and holds out the possibility
that the court would “defer” to “substantial actions” by the
legislature.32 Far from suggesting a modest role for the courts,
however, these passages firmly bolster the conclusion that Mount
Laurel must be based on a shelter-based right of some sort. He asserts
the primacy of the judiciary, “because the Constitution of our State
requires protection of the interests involved and because the
legislature has not protected them.”33 The Chief Justice concludes,
“The judicial role . . . will expand to the extent that we remain
virtually alone in this field. In the absence of adequate legislative and
executive help, we must give meaning to the constitutional doctrine
in the cases before us through our own devices, even if they are
relatively less suitable. That is the basic explanation of our decisions
32. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d. at 417. That willingness to defer came to fruition three
years later in Hills Development Co. v. Bernards Township, 510 A.2d 621 (1986), when the
Court held that a comprehensive, but flawed, legislative response, the Fair Housing Act of
1985, was facially constitutional.
33. Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 417 (emphasis added).
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today.”34
The Chief Justice’s tone is almost defiant, but the judicial process
concerns are nonetheless real and have to be addressed. In particular,
it has to be acknowledged that declaring a constitutional right to
shelter would inevitably call into question not only those regulatory
decisions that arguably burden the posited right, but also the vastly
more difficult question of whether there is an affirmative obligation
(implied by Mount Laurel II) to provide cash-based subsidies as well.
Indeed, one can glimpse the court’s reason for not stating the
constitutional basis of Mount Laurel II more frankly in its emphatic
statements, beginning in Mount Laurel I, that municipalities are not
required as part of the Mount Laurel doctrine to provide actual
housing units, but merely the regulatory “opportunity” for such
units.35 Part of the brilliance of the Mount Laurel II approach is that it
essentially induces the private market to provide housing subsidies in
exchange for enhanced profitability, subsidies that it says
governments could not be ordered to provide, the ultimate in the
privatization of a public service.36 But the record is clear that
privatization will work only up to a point, and that point appears to be
somewhere around forty percent or median income.37 Households
poorer than that will require some degree of direct subsidy, either
supplementing or replacing what inclusionary zoning can provide.
III. RECONSTRUCTING A MOUNT LAUREL RATIONALE
It would appear, then, that there is an obvious case to be made for
the existence of a constitutionally-based right to shelter in New
Jersey, flowing directly from the Rights and Liberties Clause of the
New Jersey Constitution, taken up and relied upon by the Supreme
34. Id. at 417-18 (emphasis added).
35. Mount Laurel I, supra note 3, at 192, 336 A.2d at 734 (“Courts do not build housing
nor do municipalities.”).
36. In this context, keeping in mind that Mount Laurel II was decided at high tide of the
Reagan Administration’s attack on “big government,” the decision could be seen as the ultimate
form of “privatization.”
37. See Lamar, supra note 8, at 1232-36; cf. N.J. ADMIN. CODE tit. 5, § 93-7.2(b) (1994).
(“The maximum average rent and price of low and moderate income units within each
inclusionary development shall be affordable to households earning 57.5 percent of median
income.”)
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Court in Mount Laurel I and II. By extension, a similar right can be
found in the many other state constitutions that have roughly similar
language.38 At the same time, however, it is difficult to see how a
court could fully implement such a right without trenching deeply
into the constitutional responsibilities of the political branches of
government, most notably when issues of financial subsidies for
shelter needs come into play.
It is in this context that it is useful to return to Chief Justice
Wilentz’s emphasis on the state’s control of the use of land as a
rationale for Mount Laurel II. As the preceding discussion suggests,
if there is a constitutional “right to shelter,” an individual’s claim
could easily extend to both regulatory and financial relief, with
entitlement to housing subsidies in cash being the most obvious
consequence of the “right.” To avoid the judicial management
problems that would flow from stating the right in such broad terms,
Chief Justice Wilentz somewhat arbitrarily extracts the regulatory
(“control of land”) dimension of the claim, confident (correctly, as it
turned out) that the courts could supervise the adoption of ordinances
that provide a substantial measure of shelter relief. However, he
seems to have believed that he could reach this result without
articulating a “right to shelter.” He was wrong. As I have already
argued, without articulating a right to shelter it is difficult to justify
going beyond the regulatory neutrality of Mount Laurel I to the
affirmative regulatory relief of Mount Laurel II.
Note that this puzzle has a number of interesting dimensions.
Without a constitutional right, Mount Laurel II is not fully explained.
Articulating a constitutional right, however, explains too much, in
that it would seem to require relief beyond the capacity of the judicial
system to enforce. Thus, in place of the ancient aphorism, “[f]or
every right a remedy,” Mount Laurel II implies that because there is
no remedy, there can be no right. But without a “right,” how is Mount
Laurel II itself explained?
The answer, I submit, is that Mount Laurel II actually establishes
what might be termed a “conditional” constitutional right, distinct
from “absolute” rights such as free speech and liberty of conscience.
38. See supra note 27.
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While it probably can’t be said that any right is categorically
absolute, in a classic First Amendment claim there seldom is a
legitimate reason for the government to interfere with an individual’s
exercise of the right. This is expressed in the familiar legal approach
of requiring that the government have a compelling reason to limit
free exercise. A “conditional” right, by contrast, is one that cannot as
a practical matter be exercised free of entanglement with a larger set
of social systems in which the collective citizenry has a strong and
legitimate claim. As such, an individual claim of right (as in the case
of a right to shelter) is appropriately weighed against society’s
collective interest in a way that we would not, or should not, tolerate
with respect to individual rights.39 “Conditional” rights, in other
words, trigger a balancing test.40 Society’s claims can be substantive,
as in its interest in sound land use controls. They can also be
procedural, as in preventing undemocratic courts from supplanting
the discretionary, interrelated choices made by a democratic political
process. At times, both substance (zoning) and procedure
(representative democracy) may outweigh the individual’s claim to
have the assistance of the government in obtaining shelter, but the
fact that there is a constitutionally recognized and protected right in
the balance insures that the balance will not be struck hastily or
insensitively. As reinterpreted, the Mount Laurel doctrine requires the
government to do as much as needs to be done, unless there is a good
reason why more can’t be done.
Consider how this works in the case of Chief Justice Wilentz’s
limiting criterion, the state’s control of the use of land. Land is a
scarce resource. A complex web of building codes, environmental
regulations, financing rules, tenancy codes and condominium conver-
39. The “should not” qualification reminds us that the U.S. Supreme Court has, in recent
years, moved steadily away from applying the compelling state interest test when free speech
claims come in conflict with general laws. See Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872,
(1990); City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, (1997). These decisions are wrong because, in
contrast to the “societal” rights, there is no overriding collective need to enforce general laws
that undercut sincerely held religious beliefs.
40. The concept is by no means novel. New Jersey uses a rigorous balancing test in equal
protection cases decided under the state Constitution, rejecting the multi-tiered approach that
the federal Constitution requires, at least in form. Greenberg v. Kimmelman, 494 A.2d 294
(N.J. 1985). Recall that New Jersey’s equal protection doctrine derives from the same Rights
and Liberties Clause that supports the posited right to housing.
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sion rules, to name just a few, reinforces the overwhelming
involvement of government in our lives. Many of these public in-
terventions in the land use system are convenient, even necessary,
and we need not call for their abolition and a return to an unregulated
society in order to recognize their downside for persons on the edge
of survival.41 Absent society’s intervention to serve some collective
need, individual citizens would have a wider variety of low-cost
options in meeting their basic need for shelter. Their solutions might
not be pretty, but they would be effective. A harsh example of
government’s power to forestall self-help solutions to basic needs (al-
though thankfully not a New Jersey government in this instance) is
the highly-publicized razing some years ago of an elaborate shanty-
town of dwellings for the homeless under New York City’s Manhat-
tan Bridge.42
There can be no doubt anymore about the constitutionality of land
use regulation under the police power. Thus, in exercising the police
power, it would seem equally clear that the right to acquire shelter
that we might otherwise think to be guaranteed by Article I, Section 1
of the Constitution is significantly undermined for people of limited
income. Undermined, that is, unless the concept of the police power
is itself required to accommodate individual rights actively, as well as
passively, just as Mount Laurel II dictates.
The police power, as interpreted in New Jersey and many other
jurisdictions, is subject to an overriding rule of reasonableness.43 The
police power, in the “protection” and “promotion” of unquestionably
legitimate interests, such as orderly control of the use of land, has the
potential to undercut the self-reliance of individuals in dealing with
their own basic needs, the provision of which (as we have seen) is
given constitutional protection. Thus, it can be argued that a “reas-
onable” exercise of the police power also requires that affirmative
41. On the other hand, some regulations are not useful, or can be misused to drive up costs
unnecessarily and exclude persons invidiously, as in the case of exclusionary zoning. These
“exclusionary” regulations, can now, twenty-five years into the Mount Laurel doctrine, be
invalidated without harm to collective interests.
42. See Fisher, For Homeless, A Last Haven is Demolished, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 18, 1993,
at B1.
43. See Katobimar Realty Co. v. Webster, 828 (N.J. 1956) (cited in Mount Laurel II, 336
A.2d 713); see also Payne, supra note 7, at 559.
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steps be taken by the sovereign or its delegates to minimize where
possible those forseeable adverse consequences of its exercise.44 That
there is such a duty, including a duty to make reasonable provision
for those in need of shelter, is confirmed not only by the choice of
active words such as “promote” and “protect” to describe the police
power, but also by the inescapable logic of the two Mount Laurel
decisions themselves.
Viewed as a constitutional rule that requires a realistic balancing
of public (zoning) against private (housing) claims, the progression
from Mount Laurel I to Mount Laurel II makes sense. In Mount
Laurel I, the court could plausibly have thought that if municipalities
would “get out of the way,” by repealing exclusionary constraints,
existing housing mechanisms, public and private, would work
adequately to unlock the aspirations of individuals guaranteed by
Article I. Unarticulated in this approach is a sensible conclusion that
this limited remedy strikes the proper balance between individual and
collective rights, leaving to local governments as much delegated
police power control over land use policy as is possible consistent
with the constitutional right at stake.45
In Mount Laurel II, the court concluded (reasonably) that more
aggressive measures were required, because the weak balance struck
in Mount Laurel I had resulted in a perpetuation of exclusionary
zoning without an alleviation of the shelter problems of the poor.
Because Mount Laurel I hasn’t worked, the Court in effect says, a
further tilt towards the individual is needed. “[Courts] may not build
houses, but we do enforce the constitution.”46 Inclusionary zoning,
44. The “police power” argument advanced here has on occasion been expressed in terms
of the common law doctrine of parens patriae. See, e.g., Franklin v. Department of Human
Services, 543 A.2d 56, 79 (N.J. 1988) (Pressler, J., dissenting). The common thread, of course,
is that of the state’s obligation to actively care for the well-being of its citizens. The majority
opinion in Franklin distinguished a long line of parens patriae cases on the ground that they
delineated the powers of courts of equity, not the political branches of government. This
difficulty is avoided by placing the analysis on the police power, which directly concerns the
political power of legislatures and governors to adopt and carry out the law. Franklin concerned
the state’s obligation to provide shelter to the homeless, thus making it particularly relevant
here. See infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
45. This approach is similar to the “least restrictive alternative” rule that has various
applications in federal constitutional law. See, e.g., U.S. v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (free
speech); Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349 (1951) (dormant commerce clause).
46. 456 A.2d at 417. (N.J. 1994).
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carefully conformed to environmental and other sound planning
criteria, is within the police power of government and, by definition,
not harmful. Municipal corporations, whose powers derive from
delegation rather than sovereignty, have always been subject to
affirmative judicial control.47 Judicially mandated inclusionary
zoning therefore is within the capacity of courts to order without
overriding legitimate collective interests in having social controls on
the use of land. Hence, the balance is restruck.48
Approached as a “conditional” right, subject to a balancing
approach that is inappropriate for the traditional category of
“individual” rights, it is easy to see what is wrong with the land use
solution sometimes favored by conservative economists who criticize
Mount Laurel and inclusionary zoning for replacing one imperfect
regulatory scheme with another, where their preferred solution would
be to eliminate zoning altogether.49 Of course, if there were no land
use controls, it would be relatively simple for individuals to satisfy
their own housing needs, thus effectuating the promise of the
constitution’s Rights and Liberties clause.50 The class of those utterly
unable to meet their own needs would be small enough (and
compelling enough) that the state would undoubtedly provide relief
from destitution voluntarily, on the basis of elementary compassion.
47. Pane, NEW JERSEY PRACTICE: LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAW § 2.20 at 44 and n.1 (W,
1999) (citing Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 417).
48. Implicit also in this approach is the explanation of why the court could not simply
order the abolition of zoning, leaving individuals and the free market to provide a variety of
housing choices. Abolition of zoning would require only a negative injunction, well within the
traditional power of the courts, and it might well give housing “pioneers” sufficient room to
meet their own needs in their own way. But the cost to society’s collective interest in the
legitimate use of the land use control power would be so great as to strike the balance
unreasonably between the individual and society.
49. See FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS (1985); Exclusionary Zoning and
Growth Controls: A Comment on the APA’s Endorsement of the Mount Laurel Doctrine, 40
WASH. U.J. URB. & CONTEMP. L. 65 (1991).
50. Recognizing that not all land use controls are “inefficient,” even in the skeptical
framework of microeconomic analysis, Professor Robert Ellickson has proposed a regime of
privately-enforced norms measured in substantial part by a common law nuisance rule of
“contemporary community standards.” Robert Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants,
Nuisance Rules and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 733. Once one
accepts going this far, however, judicial balancing of competing interests is inevitable, with all
of the attendant judicial process concerns that my approach fairly raises. At that point, there is
no reason not to strive for the more equitable balance that would result from the inclusion of a
“conditional” constitutional right in the mix.
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Judicial intervention to enforce the constitution would not be
necessary.
In contrast to this view, the Chief Justice, ever the pragmatist,
understood that land use controls have substantial social value in their
own right, and he knew that they were not about to wither away
anytime soon in the modern state. What Mount Laurel II’s “control of
land” passage means, then, is that because the state, as a practical
matter, will continue to decide how land is used, therefore it must
cure what otherwise would be a serious defect in its system, the
restriction on an individual’s ability to provide for him or herself.
Moreover, since the state as a practical matter will continue to
delegate the land use power to municipalities, it must also cure the in-
evitable tendency of delegated power to deteriorate into local paroch-
ialism, to the extent that it is realistically able to do so.51 The paradox
of this reformulation is that while the nominal focus of the Mount
Laurel opinions is on the individual’s “realistic opportunity” to
acquire shelter, the actual, practical consequence is to focus on the
municipality’s “realistic opportunity” to provide it. Moreover, as the
progression from Mount Laurel I to Mount Laurel II demonstrates,
the reformulated “realistic opportunity” standard in my revisionist
rereading of Mount Laurel II appears to permit step-by-step
compliance, rather than requiring the most aggressive judicial
intervention ab initio. 52
51. See John M. Payne, Delegation Doctrine in the Reform of Local Government Law:
The Case of Exclusionary Zoning, 29 RUTGERS L. REV. 803 (1976).
52. The guarantees of Article I, Paragraph 1 of the New Jersey Constitution run against
individuals as well as against the state. See State v. Schmid, 423 A.2d 615 (1980) (obligation of
Princeton University, a private institution, to permit political leafleting on campus). Following
from this, a literalist might argue that the constitutional right to shelter obligates every private
property owner to accommodate the shelter needs of those less fortunate, whether they can pay
or not. If a purported right to shelter could only be enforced in this absolutist way, we can be
absolutely certain that a court would simply construe the claimed right out of Article I,
Paragraph 1’s language. Far from doing so, however, Schmid actually reinforces the argument
that shelter is a “conditional” constitutional right.
Under the circumstances of Schmid, involving a campus open to a wide variety of persons
and groups, the court’s conclusion that the classic right of a property owner to exclude weighed
less than the leafletter’s right to communicate makes sense; presumably, however, the same
balancing test would have denied the leafletter permission to harangue dinner guests at the
university President’s home. Under this reasoning, the natural right to find shelter from the
elements implicitly guaranteed by our constitution does exist as to private persons, but in most
conceivable circumstances it would be outweighed by the inappropriateness of imposing the
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IV. THE CONSEQUENCES OF A RIGHT TO SHELTER
One reason to inquire into the constitutional basis of the Mount
Laurel II decision is that doing so shows us much more clearly what
remains to be done. Lacking such an inquiry, the Mount Laurel
process has stagnated, as the Council on Affordable Housing
promulgates an ever-more complex delineation of the rules for
implementing inclusionary zoning, while at the same time wringing
its metaphorical hands at its inability to solve problems that do not
yield to inclusionary zoning solutions. There is much more that could
be done, and even if one accepts the step-by-step method implied by
the progression of cases, further recalibration of the balance would
seem to be in order.
Without attempting comprehensiveness, it is possible to identify at
least six holes in the Mount Laurel doctrine’s social safety net:53
(1) a failure to address the needs of households at or near the
poverty line; at present, virtually no Mount Laurel housing is
created for households with less than 40% of the regional
median income;54
(2) a failure to address the needs of younger families with
larger numbers of children, as opposed particularly to age-
restricted senior housing;
(3) a failure to produce large amount of rental housing, as
opposed to for-sale housing, with rental housing being much
more accessible to truly poor families;
(4) a failure to deal the problem of “cost burdened”
households, those who live in physically adequate housing but
pay an excessive portion of their income to do so; this number
obligation to assist on private persons. Thus, it is an efficient shorthand to speak in of the
constitutional guarantee running against governments alone because the government’s interest
will less often be as weighty as a private individual’s.
53. This catalogue is based on the author’s experience handling Mount Laurel cases, and
can also be discerned generally from Lamar et al., supra note 7; Payne, supra note 9; and
Naomi Wish & Stephen Eisdorfer, Mount Laurel Housing Symposium, The Impact of Mount
Laurel Initiatives: an Analysis of The Characteristics of Applicants And Occupants, 27 SETON
HALL L. REV. 1268 (1997).
54. See supra note 37.
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is double or triple the number of households living in
substandard quarters, the only ones who are presently counted
as part of the “need” addressed by Mount Laurel’s fair share
requirement;
(5) a failure to achieve fair share compliance in older, more
fully developed suburbs closer-in to center cities; and
(6) a failure to extend Mount Laurel’s benefits to households
of color.
Reformulating the Mount Laurel doctrine to emphasize the
constitutional right to shelter and the governmental obligation to meet
the housing need to the maximum practicable extent would not
necessarily solve all of the problems listed above, but I am confident
that it would move us firmly in that direction. Many of the problems
just identified flow from the fact that market-driven inclusionary
zoning is not well adapted to meeting the needs of the very poor and
very large households, the need for rental housing, and the need for
infill housing in urban areas. That is not the kind of housing, with or
without an inclusionary component, that most large developers feel
they can build or want to build.55 New Jersey’s Council on
Affordable Housing (COAH), which now administers most Mount
Laurel compliance, has tried to provide incentives that move the
market in the desired direction, but at some cost. COAH has
demonstrated, for instance, that some municipalities will require
construction of rental housing, but only by giving them a “bonus” in
the form of a reduction in their numerical fair share obligation,
presently a credit of two fair share units for every one unit of rental
housing.56
A reformulated Mount Laurel doctrine would not cast aside
inclusionary zoning, which has worked very well under some
circumstances, but it would require asking what else can be done. It
may be time to require provision of rental housing, for instance,
without any “bonuses” that perversely reduce housing opportunities
55. The most prominent exception on my list is the problem of racial disparity, which
could be addressed much more aggressively using presently-available fair housing laws.
56. See N. J. ADMIN. Code 5:93-5.15(d)(1).
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for other households. It may be time to require that every
municipality’s compliance plan address alternate ways to provide
housing to families below the income level that is the de facto floor
on private developer’s willingness to do so, such as by facilitating the
participation of non-profit and governmental housing sponsors that
have the will and the ways to dig deeper. Non-profits can also
contribute to the provision of affordable housing in older, more
developed suburban areas, where inclusionary zoning does not work
very well because of the absence of large developable tracts of land.
A reformulated Mount Laurel doctrine would also require
municipalities to creatively package available subsidies to
supplement, rather than replace, inclusionary solutions, so that as
much is accomplished with the total bundle of resources, rather than
the least. Lacking a full constitutional rationale for Mount Laurel II,
it has been difficult to persuade COAH and the courts that such steps
could be constitutionally required.57 Yet all of these potential
remedial devices, essentially absent from the compliance mix at
present, are “realistic” when balanced against collective interests
because they would increase housing opportunities for individuals
without cognizable detriment to the collective interests of the
municipalities involved (a baldly stated interest in excluding poor
people no longer being cognizable).58
A further salutary consequence of reformulating the Mount Laurel
doctrine as suggested here is that a more candid focus on the right to
shelter would make plain that the Mount Laurel obligation lies not
only with municipalities, but also with the state itself. Because New
Jersey, like all states, delegates virtually all zoning power to local
governments, and Mount Laurel compliance has been largely equated
with inclusionary zoning, it is predictable that Mount Laurel litigation
has concentrated on municipalities. It is beyond question, however,
57. A reformulated Mount Laurel doctrine would require the Supreme Court to look again
at the question of permitting attorney fee awards to public interest plaintiffs who successfully
pursue a Mount Laurel claim. It is beyond argument that, if adequately financed, public interest
litigants will pursue a broader range of solutions than will private developers, whose “fee”
derives only from the profit in an inclusionary development. SEE GENERALLY, Payne, supra
note 11, at 677 n.48.
58. Sensitively (and sensibly) applied, the balancing approach would appear to satisfy the
microeconomist’s criterion of pareto optimality.
Washington University Open Scholarship
p555+Payne.doc 01/04/01
578 Festschrift [Vol. 3:555
that the state itself has the ultimate responsibility for guaranteeing the
rights and liberties of its citizens, and so the whispered hint in Mount
Laurel II about the state’s obligation needs to become a shout.59
Because land use regulation is so pervasively delegated to local
governments, the scope of potential state action is correlatively
reduced. One response, of course, would be to argue that some of the
delegated power should be reclaimed by the state, in order to use it in
a more effective, less parochial way. The legislature has already
partially accomplished this with the passage of the 1985 Fair Housing
Act60 and the creation of COAH. But the Fair Housing Act is a
deeply flawed statute from the perspective of maximizing housing
opportunities, and much more could be done. Under the reformulated
Mount Laurel doctrine, for instance, the courts could be asked to
order elimination of the voluntary feature of the act, so that all 566
New Jersey municipalities would be required to participate and
present a fair share plan. By definition, COAH compliance is
something municipal governments can do consistent with the public
interest, since the law (to say nothing of the constitution) permits
them to do so. Just as occurred in the shift from Mount Laurel I to
Mount Laurel II, shifting the Fair Housing Act from a passive to an
active mode, from voluntary to mandatory compliance, simply
recalibrates the rights balance once the weaker balance proves
inadequate, without adversely affecting any legitimate collective
interest in the process.
V. HARD QUESTIONS
Expanding the breadth and depth of the Mount Laurel doctrine, as
I have suggested in the foregoing paragraphs, is well within the
competence of the judicial system and soundly mandated by the
restated constitutional logic of Mount Laurel II. Candor compels
recognition, however, that the implications of a “right to shelter,”
even the more limited “conditional right” that I have posited here, can
59. “While the state may not have the ability to eliminate poverty, it cannot use that
condition as the basis for imposing further disadvantages. And the same applies to the
municipality . . .” 456 A.2d at 415.
60. N.J. STAT. ANN. 52:27D-301 (1994).
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be pushed close to the margins of judicial process. These marginal
implications require more extensive analysis that is possible here, but
I will mention two problems briefly in the hopes of demonstrating
that they need not prove fatal to the recognition of the constitutional
right in the first place.
One problem has already been hinted at. The state’s primary role
in meeting the shelter needs of its citizens (as compared to that of
local governments) is to provide housing subsidies, and it requires
little, I presume, to persuade the reader that judicial management of
state budgetary matters is difficult at best and potentially disruptive
of democratic self-government. The other is that once a right to
shelter has been established, there is no obvious reason why a similar
process of reasoning could not justify a whole set of welfare rights
claims. The Chief Justice tries to limit this with the “control of land”
rationale, but land is just one of many aspects of modern life that is
subject to state control. Public utilities are much more closely
regulated than land, for instance,61 but there is no constitutional
doctrine requiring “affordable heat.”62 Automobile insurance is
mandatory and subject to comprehensive state control,63 but there
assuredly is no such thing as affordable auto insurance in New
Jersey.64 The state owns most mass transit systems,65 and closely
61. See N.J.S.A. § 48:2-13 (New Jersey Board of Public Utility Commissioners granted
“general supervision and regulation of and jurisdiction and control over all public utilities. . . .
and their property, property rights, equipment, facilities and franchises . . . .”); Lambertville
Water Co. v. New Jersey Bd. of Pub. Util. Comm’rs., 401 A.2d 211 (1979) (regulatory agency
has “broad powers over all aspects of public utility including the power to fix the rates which a
utility may charge its customers.”)
62. Sterling v. Village of Maywood, 579 F.2d 1350, 1353 n.7 (7th Cir. 1978) cert. denied,
440 U.S. 913 (1979) (utility consumer without direct contractual relationship to supplier has no
constitutionally protected interest in continued service); Lamb v. Hamblin, 57 F.R.D. 58, 61-62
(D. Minn 1972) (procedural due process rights of utility consumers are limited to those willing
to assume financial responsibility for that service).
63. See N.J.S.A. § 39:6A-3 (automobile insurance mandatory); In re “Plan for Orderly
Withdrawal from New Jersey” of Twin City Fire Insurance Co., 609 A.2d 1248, 1285 (1992)
(upholding regulation requiring insurer to either sustain losses or market certain specific
services as consistent with due process).
64. See Michael S. Smith, State Hunts Insurance Cheaters, PHILADELPHIA INQUIRER, Oct.
19, 1991, at B1 (New Jersey auto insurance rates are among the highest in the country, starting
at over $800.00 per car).
65. See Neil Hamilton et al., A Comparison of Governance of Publicly-Owned Mass
Transit, 6 CANADIAN-U.S. L.J. 1, 5 (1983) (only 9% of the 117 largest metropolitan areas in the
country are served by private mass transit operators).
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regulates the others,66 yet poor people do not ride for free. The cost
burden of heat and hot water, insurance, and transportation to work
are often crucial to the elemental survival of low and moderate
income households, but there is no Council on Elemental Survival; at
best, poor people are assured some minimum procedural due process
rights before losing their access to most regulated commodities for
inability to pay.67
As these examples show, pondering the implications of a right to
shelter will be challenging, to say the least. So long as it is
understood that “conditional” rights claims are not absolute, however,
but instead are subject to a sensible balancing process, there should
be no reason to fear asking the questions in the first place. The
constitutional claim “counts,” but it does not outweigh all other
societal interests. It is always there, but not always possible to
vindicate. But when vindication is impossible, both the government
and a reviewing court should be obligated to give reasoned
explanations of why not, in salutary contradistinction to the present
regime of legal doctrine, which muzzles moral dialogue by denying
even the existence of claims to basic subsistence needs met under at
least some circumstances.
Thus, it may sometimes (but not always) be appropriate for courts
to venture into financial matters in order to effectuate shelter rights.
In a series of cases arising after Mount Laurel II, for instance, the
New Jersey Supreme Court overrode an effort by the political
branches to sharply limit shelter benefit for homeless individuals to a
few months, holding that benefits had to be continued.68 This humane
result was achieved even though the court studiously ignored a claim
that homeless people had a constitutional right to shelter, the most
straightforward explanation for the outcome. Instead the court
66. See N.J.S.A. §§ 48:4-1 to 4-6 (state regulation of the rates, routes, operations and
maintenance of privately-owned autobuses).
67. See Memphis Light, Gas and Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U.S. 1, 18 (1978) (observing
that “[u]tility service is a necessity of modern life,” and holding that due process requires an
opportunity for a hearing prior to termination of service).
68. See Williams v. Department of Human Services, 561 A.2d 244 (1989) (Williams I);
583 A.2d 297 (1989) (Williams II); 583 A.2d 351(1990) (Williams III); L.T. v. Department of
Human Services, 633 A.2d 964 (1993) (summarizing earlier cases). I represented the ACLU of
New Jersey amicus curiae in these cases, inconclusively arguing the constitutional point. Some
of the research for these briefs has found its way into earlier sections of this essay.
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strained to construe both administrative regulations and statutory law
as mandating continued benefits, an analysis which had little
persuasive power when one consults the actual texts. Obviously, the
Court thought that it was feasible to order the state to continue
spending money that the state wanted to divert to other purposes.
Apparently, however, the court also thought this result would be
more “legitimate” if it was seen as dictated by the will of the political
branches, but it undercuts the search for legitimacy if the court first
has to distort the will of the political branches, as it did in these cases,
in order to nominally follow that will. Better, I submit, to
acknowledge frankly the extent to which constitutional rights
legitimately dictate the outcome, while at the same time fashioning
reasonable limits on the extent of the right, rather than leaving
everything in doctrinal limbo, as the court did in the actual cases.69
Expanding the concept of a right to shelter into a general theory of
welfare rights is, needless to say, an even more difficult matter, one
requiring a good deal of careful analysis. Suffice it to say here, as a
prelude to further consideration of this interesting question, that at the
time of Mount Laurel II shelter needs were the least well provided for
of any of the basic set of subsistence needs that could be placed under
the state constitution. While the state had then (and still has)
extensive, state-level programs supporting health, education, and
alleviating destitution, housing policy was left largely to the federal
government or delegated away to local governments without mean-
ingful supervision. The same could be said partially about education,
in that huge financial responsibilities were shifted to local
governments despite a glaring maldistribution of the property tax
69. The tension between what the court means and what it says is palpable in its
peroration at the end of the L.T. case:
The question before us is not whether the homeless have a constitutional right to
shelter. Rather, it is, for now, what the Legislature intends. In Williams I, supra, we
concluded that then-Governor Kean, by his allusion to the poet Robert Frost’s
description of home, “surely intend[ed] that every citizen of New Jersey has a place to
go where they must take you in.” We believe that the executive and legislative
branches of New Jersey’s government still share that intention. The question still
“need[s] to be answered in the plain language of the streets: who is in charge here and
how is the problem to be solved?”
633 A.2d at 974 (internal citations omitted).
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base that virtually guaranteed inequitable results. Thus, it is no
surprise that the two leading areas of human rights reform that have
been stimulated by judicial review in New Jersey have been shelter
policy under the Mount Laurel doctrine and education finance under
Robinson v. Cahill70 and its successor, Abbott v. Burke.71
VI. CONCLUSION
This being a festschrift, and in light of the unconventional position
staked out herein, it is probably appropriate to paraphrase the
standard government disclaimer by noting that the honoree bears no
responsibility for the author’s opinions, which do not necessarily
reflect the honoree’s, or anyone else’s, point of view. While it is true
that Dan Mandelker is quintessentially careful and precise in his
scholarship, it is also true that his work has always been infused with
humane, inclusionary concerns and by a willingness to put doctrine to
the use of social justice. He has never hesitated to tell me when he
thought I was slipping into error (editing a casebook together
provides plenty of opportunity for those discussions). But at the same
time he has always encouraged me, as others, to reach for new and
interesting ways to think about age-old problems. It is in that spirit
that I have offered these thoughts.
70. 351 A.2d 713 (1975).
71. 643 A.2d 575 (1994). For a full citation list of the eight Robinson cases and three (thus
far) Abbott cases, see Paul L. Tractenberg, A Clear and Powerful Voice for Poor Urban
Students: Chief Justice Robert Wilentz’s Role in Abbott v. Burke, 49 RUTGERS L. REV. 719
(1997).
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